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COVID-19 and Digital Exclusion: Insights and 




1. Digital exclusion is not just about a lack of access to broadband; it covers an array of 
issues relating to levels of access, levels of digital skills, and education – it is about 
both breadth and depth of digital engagement. 
2. COVID-19 lockdowns and associated public health measures have highlighted the 
extent and consequences of digital exclusion for individuals and households across 
the UK, especially in relation to education, employment – with many people unable to 
work remotely from home – health, wellbeing and access to public services. 
3. Developing approaches to measuring and monitoring digital inequalities is critical to 
the creation of policy interventions that work towards ensuring a “100% digitally 
included population”. A key part of this is the identification of citizens who are 
“limited” users of digital systems. 
4. A much greater proportion of citizens are either limited or narrow users of digital 
services than might be expected. In the Liverpool City Region (LCR), we approximate 
that just under 600,000 citizens are limited or non-users of digital systems. Around 
30,000 households with school age children are offline or led by limited users. 
5. Digital inclusion and intervention strategies have to deliver more than cheap or free 
access – needing to meet citizens “where they are” and helping to build “spaces to 
be digital” within homes and communities. In pursuing social and economic recovery, 
policymakers should define a “minimum digital living standard”, avoid “one size fits 
all” or “technology-led” solutions, and not ignore the skills needs of young people. 
 
1. Introduction  
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought 
issues of digital exclusion and inequality to 
the fore – and spawned the term “digital 
poverty”. However, digital exclusion is not 
a new phenomenon. Exclusion from 
access to technology and information has 
been noted since the 1970s. The shift of 
both public and private services, systems 
and even everyday leisure activities online 
means that the combination of digital 
inequality with other aspects of social, 
economic, and cultural inequality can have 
significant impacts on citizens’ lives. 
Colleagues and I have been exploring 
these issues and policy interventions for 
the last decade regionally, nationally, and 
internationally. Importantly, digital 
exclusion and inequalities are not just 
about a lack of access to broadband 
(though access is the starting point), but 
also differential levels of access, skills, 
education, cost, and often networks of 
support. It is not just about material 
resources to use “digital” or access “digital 
spaces”, but the social, cultural and 
economic capital to “be digital” and the 
“space to be digital” – the latter refers to 
both physical (could be a desk workspace) 
but also social space (such as privacy for 
Zoom calls). COVID-19 and other 
associated public health measures have 
extensively highlighted these issues. 
Working with the Good Things 
Foundation, our research (e.g. Yates et al. 
2020a, 2020b, 2018, 2015a, 2015b) has 
drawn on Ofcom data on Adults’ Media 
Use and Attitudes to track this “digital 
divide” over time. Unfortunately, elements 
of this divide stubbornly remain. Our 
analysis has informed the Good Things 
Foundation in the 2020 update of their 
Digital Nation infographic, which gathers 
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the facts and statistics about digital 
inclusion and exclusion in the UK. 
This policy briefing explores how we have 
utilised this data to identify different types 
of “digital users”, and the demographics of 
these groups. A first approximation is then 
made of the numbers of citizens and 
households that are most digitally 
challenged in the Liverpool City Region 
(LCR). I conclude with several 
recommendations on how to address 
digital exclusion as the LCR seeks to 
“build back better” from the pandemic.  
2. COVID-19 and digital exclusion 
As society has responded to the 
challenges of COVID-19, issues 
concerning digital inequality have become 
abundantly clear – be they lack of access 
to digital tools for home schooling or 
accessing public services and support 
online (e.g. APLE Collective 2020). 
Importantly, this is not simply about those 
who are “offline” and those “online”, but 
the fact that many citizens use digital 
systems for quite limited purposes. This is 
due to limited access or having limited 
digital skills, or both. For example, looking 
at the situation just before COVID-19, 
using the Ofcom 2019 Children’s Media 
Use and Attitudes Survey data we found 
that 23.4% of 5-15 year olds in the poorest 
households (National Readership Survey 
(NRS) Grades D and E) do not have 
access to both an educationally useable 
device (laptop, desktop or tablet) and 
broadband (Ofcom 2020a). This equates 
to 524,871 UK children, of whom 74,225 
are likely studying for their GCSEs. 
If we consider the children who can only 
access a shared device or do not have 
access to broadband, the numbers rise 
dramatically. There is, therefore, a sliding 
scale of access and use, suggesting very 
different capabilities in responding to 
COVID-19 – in this case home schooling. 
This pattern holds for all aspects of digital 
access and use, across all ages. 
Much government policy remains focused 
on material access (availability of 
broadband) and those who are “offline” 
(non-users). There is also an assumption 
that once citizens have obtained access to 
digital systems and media or digital skills 
that they will continue to remain “users”. 
However, evidence from both the UK and 
USA indicates that access can vary over 
time and the life course. For example, 
households might lose access due to high 
internet service provider (ISP) or mobile 
costs causing termination of contracts. 
Longer term, current users may cease to 
use some or all digital systems at key life 
stages. This is especially marked in post-
retirement, when digital skills often 
become obsolete as technology changes. 
These issues underline that assessing 
digital inequalities and their consequences 
requires a deeper understanding of this 
reality – that digital inequality includes but 
is not just about being offline. The COVID-
19 pandemic is accelerating the pace of 
digital transformation within society, 
underscoring the need to scrutinise the 
rapid changes currently taking place and 
to strive for policy interventions that work 
towards ensuring a “100% digitally 
included population” (Milner 2020).  
3. Types of users of digital systems 
Over the last five years, in collaboration 
with the Good Things Foundation, 
colleagues and I have been developing an 
approach to measuring and monitoring 
digital inequalities (Yates et al. 2020a, 
2018, 2015b). A key part of this has been 
the identification of citizens who are 
“limited” users of digital systems. Our 
analysis is based on the data collected 
each year by the Ofcom Adults’ Media 
Literacy Survey. This year’s analysis once 
again identified seven user groups – as 
described in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Types of user of digital systems in the UK 
1 
Extensive users (18%) – this group scores the highest probabilities across all 
behaviours, including a higher than average variety of apps and sites used. 
2 
Non-political extensive users (15%) – this group scores slightly lower across all 
behaviours as ‘Extensive’ users but notably excepting political uses, including a higher 
than average variety of apps and sites used. 
3 
General (no social media) users (8%) – this group has a similar behaviour to the 
‘Extensive’ users but does not use social media, including a higher than average 
variety of apps and sites used. 
4 
Social and entertainment media only users (17%) – this group has low usage 
probabilities (below 50%) on all behaviours except social media and audio-visual 
media consumption, but within this a higher than average variety of apps and sites 
used. 
5 
Limited (social media) users (17%) – this group has low usage probabilities (below 
50%) on all behaviours except social media and a lower variety of apps and sites 
used. 
6 
Limited (no social media) users (10%) – this group has low usage probabilities 
(below 50%) on all behaviours and a lower variety of apps and sites used. 
7 Non-users (15%) 
 
Source: Ofcom 2020b
Over time, the proportions of citizens 
within each of these groups has changed, 
with the development of the “social and 
entertainment media only” users as well 
as growth in “extensive” users. 
How did we define users? 
In our research, we do not start with a 
definition of what is an “extensive” user or 
a “limited” user – although, of course, non-
users are predefined as those people who 
do not use digital devices and systems at 
home or elsewhere. Rather, our analysis 
considers the 17 digital media and 
systems “uses” measured by the Ofcom 
Adult Media Literacy survey (Ofcom 
2020b). Using a method called “latent 
class analysis”, we group the survey 
respondents according to their answers. 
The analysis categorises the respondents 
according to the similarity of their 
responses, creating groups that have 
similar “probabilities” for each of the 
“uses”. This does not mean everyone in 
the group is the same – just that the 
people in the group are likely to be most 
similar.  
By doing the analysis in this way, we 
avoid imposing a definition of the groups. 
Instead, we identify the groups and then 
try to understand them and their 
characteristics. Thus, we can see how 
groups change over time. This approach 
also allows some level of relative measure 
– these are “limited” users compared to 
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the rest of the population. However, in 
fact, the levels of engagement for “limited” 
users have changed little over time. 
What can we say about limited and 
non-users? 
We are particularly interested in 
understanding more about the different 
types of “limited” users, because they are 
most likely to be overlooked in the 
development of policies and practices to 
address digital inequality. Our analysis 
identifies three types of “limited” users 
who we view as being at risk of differing 
levels of digital exclusion and inequality. 
The first of these groups is “social and 
entertainment media only” users, who 
represent around 11 million adults in the 
UK (or 17% of the population). These 
narrowly focused users are more likely to 
be younger people (under 35) who have 
left school at 18 or before, are in lower 
skilled work, poorer households and urban 
areas. 
“Limited (social media)” users (17% of the 
population) and “Limited (no social 
media)” users (10% of the population) 
represent the second and third of these 
groups, equating to around 17 million 
adults. These groups are demographically 
very similar and are more likely to be older 
(above 55 years old), have left school at 
18 or before, have a disability or health 
issues, and be unemployed or retired and 
financially vulnerable. They are more likely 
to be in the NRS social grades D and E 
(households on low or very low incomes). 
These groups significantly lack confidence 
in their digital skills.  
Additional analysis also indicates the role 
of place in shaping access and skills. 
”Limited” users who do not use social 
media are more likely to live in rural areas, 
particularly those marked by deprivation 
such as in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. “Limited” users who do use social 
media, by contrast, are more likely to live 
in areas of urban deprivation in the East 
Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber, 
North East England, and Northern Ireland. 
Non-users (15%) – the final group – 
amount to around 10 million adults across 
the UK. Non-users do not directly engage 
with digital systems. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the characteristics of non-
users are very similar to “limited” users but 
are generally older, and even more likely 
to have health issues and to be living in 
social housing. 
4. What is the picture in the 
Liverpool City Region? 
Taking the percentages for the North West 
of England, it is possible to approximate 
the numbers of citizens in each of these 
categories within the LCR – see Table 2. 
Table 2. Population of LCR by digital user 
group 
 Population Percent 




General users 180,793 12.64% 












Policy Briefing 031             Page 6 
Breaking the data down further, we can 
approximate the following for LCR: 
 22.70% of working age residents 
(324,590) are “limited” or non-
users. 
 30,560 households with school age 
children are offline or headed by 
limited users. 
These are approximations. Detailed 
statistics at sub-regional level are not 
available at present. Given the importance 
of local contextual support solutions, 
collecting or accurately modelling such 
data is a future priority. 
Why is this important? 
Understanding the different ways in which 
citizens access and use the internet – and 
looking into the detail of digital exclusion – 
is key to planning interventions and 
support, and developing policies that 
address differences across ages and 
geographies. This analysis makes clear 
that there is a need to understand the 
capabilities – skills, equipment and 
context – of users in order to best help 
and support them.  
At a time when the youngest workers, as 
well as the oldest, have been identified as 
most vulnerable to the economic fall-out of 
COVID-19 (Major et al. 2020), it is 
particularly important to consider the 
interventions needed to support the “social 
and entertainment media only” users. 
Young people with few qualifications are 
disproportionately represented in this 
group. It is critical that they are enabled to 
develop the digital skills needed for the 
workplace to avoid a long-term 
“generational scarring”. 
5. Policy interventions to help 
“build back better” 
The issues presented in this briefing 
clearly connect with a range of policy 
goals detailed in the Liverpool City Region 
Combined Authority’s (LCRCA) Building 
Back Better economic recovery plan –  
most notably the commitment to: 
“…engage with Government on an 
ambitious national programme to 
eradicate digital poverty and secure 
funding to ensure everyone in our City 
Region has access to hardware, 
broadband connections and basic digital 
training” (LCRCA, 2020, p.23). 
However, we should also move beyond an 
approach that solely focuses on access 
and training, towards one that considers 
the context in which citizens engage with 
digital. Importantly, such an approach 
needs to consider the ways in which 
digital can both enable citizens but also 
exacerbate or reinforce aspects of 
inequality. We need to understand that for 
all stakeholders – whether public, private 
or third sector organisations – digital 
exclusion and inequalities are “problems 
for everyone but owned by no one”. For 
instance, if they are framed as a skills 
issue, they often fall to education 
providers alone to address. A different 
approach is required. 
To help address these issues in the LCR 
in the social and economic recovery post-
coronavirus, policymakers should consider 
the following: 
1) Assess and understand what it means 
to be a digital citizen in the LCR – 
what basket of goods, services, skills, 
and competencies do individuals and 
households need in contemporary 
society? Defining this “minimum 
digital living standard” would provide 
a baseline on which to build policy 
interventions; 
2) Avoid “one size fits all” or 
“technology-led” solutions. The 
evidence suggests that such 
interventions often fail, especially in 
the longer term. Liverpool has a 
positive history of developing digital 
inclusion strategies. A key feature of 
their success was the involvement of 
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multiple stakeholders across the City 
Region, from travel services, health 
services, employers, unions, regional 
and national charities, local 
government, and community groups. 
Linking these stakeholders allows 
interventions “where citizens are”, but 
also makes digital inclusion a priority 
across all regional partners. 
3) Do not ignore the needs of young 
people. The data presented here 
makes clear that many young people, 
especially those leaving education 
earlier, can become very narrow 
users of digital systems. Put bluntly, 
“Facebook skills” (or related to 
Instragram, TikTok and other 
services) are often of little use in a 
manufacturing business or when 
using digital health technology.   
The LCRCA’s Building Back Better 
recovery plan rightly highlights many 
digital economy opportunities within the 
City Region. We need to ensure that all 
citizens, at all ages and career stages, are 
able to engage with those opportunities. 
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